

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

APRIL GALLOP, for herself and as Mother
And Next Friend of ELISHA GALLOP, a Minor,

Plaintiff

No. 08 CV 10881

AFFIDAVIT OF

ROBIN D. HORDON

vs.

DICK CHENEY, Vice President of the U.S.A.,
DONALD RUMSFELD, former U.S. Secretary of
Defense, General RICHARD MYERS, U.S.A.F.
(Ret.), and John Does Nos. 1-X, all in their
individual capacities,

Defendants

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBIN D. HORDON

I, Robin Dirk Hordon, declare, under the penalty of perjury:

1. I am a former Air Traffic Controller who worked at the Boston ARTCC [Air Route Traffic Control Center] located in Nashua, NH, and further, worked the specific airspace in which American Airlines flight Eleven [AA11] went off course and showed signs of an “in-flight emergency” before being considered a “hijacked aircraft” on September 11, 2001.

2. As an employee of the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], in addition to performing all the skills and requirements of an Air Traffic Controller, I also served for several years in a management capacity [in an “Area Office”] which is charged with developing and coordinating airspace and procedural changes, improvements and modifications, and this included working closely with the U.S. Military aviation operations.

3. I have served in a temporary supervisory role at specific “area specialties” in which I supervised operations of several air traffic control sectors. I assigned and supervised personnel which required that I have basic understandings of communications and procedures required to perform all the duties required of an area of specialty including the communications flows upward to higher supervisory levels, downward to sector operations, parallel to other areas of specialty and outward to various other air traffic control facilities, including military facilities, with whom we shared many common goals.

4. As an Air Traffic Controller, Area Specialist and Facility Training Instructor, I was part of the team that upgraded the entire Air Traffic Control system into a computerized era installing and performing the upgrade training required for the use of the IBM9020 computer and its RDP [Radar Data Processing] computer programs. This enabled me to become familiar with both older analogue and modern digitized radar systems. I am familiar with how radar data is collected and how it is chosen or selected to be displayed at FAA air traffic control sectors in the ARTCC environment.

5. As an Air Traffic Controller, I have experienced the successful scrambling of military aviation assets in the assistance of an aircraft suffering an in-flight emergency. Additionally, I was peripherally involved in an aviation hijacking and directly involved in handling a US Air Carrier which reportedly had on board an altitude sensitive bomb as it transited through my airspace.

6. I have performed the duties required of me as part of the National Air Defense System working closely with Air Defense Command [the precedent organization to NORAD, the North American Air Dense system] in the operation of various War Games, low altitude Oil Burner Bombing Runs, aerial refueling, scramble and flush operations, and interceptor operations.

7. I have accumulated 1600 hours of flight time in light aircraft ascending to pilot of a third level air carrier operating small twin engined aircraft in the northeastern part of the U.S.A.

8. I have achieved the following piloting licenses:
Commercial Pilots License with an Instrument Rating and with the following ratings:

Airplane Single Engine Land

Airplane Single Engine Sea

Airplane Multi-engine Land

Glider

Flight Instructor Airplanes and Instruments

9. I have been certified as a ground instructor and passed the Flight Engineer Basic Exam that was based upon the B727 aircraft.

10. I have accumulated approximately 2000 hours of supervised aviation mechanic training working on airframes and engines, and the installation of electronics in light aircraft.

11. I have a solid understanding of aviation operations from aircraft upkeep, repair and fixed-base operations, to the flying of aircraft, to the training of new pilots, to understanding, operating and training within the air traffic control system as a pilot, to understanding, performing duties and training, that is required of air traffic controllers in the NAS [National Airspace Systems] in the En Route ATC [ARTCC] environment including, being an integral part of Military Aviation Operations and the National Air Defense System as well as pertaining to procedural and airspace development, planning and operations, which also includes operating with Military Aviation facilities such as NORAD as part of the National Air Defense System.

12. As the attacks of 9/11/2001 ensued, and then shortly thereafter, upon finding out that there was no major communication or radar system failure between the FAA facilities and those of NORAD in the morning hours of 9/11/2001, I concluded that there had to have been a major failure of the National Air Defense System, specifically, within the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], the Pentagon, and NORAD. Somehow the standard operating procedures, finely honed for over 50 years, operating to defend the United States, had been stood down or compromised to allow such an attack to be successful.

SPECIFIC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION, FACTS, and EVIDENCE

13. In the ensuing years after 9/11/2001 I have had access to information, facts, data, and evidence that supports the statement shown in Paragraph 12. Below, I set out this information and my interpretations of, and conclusions about, this evidence.

SCRAMBLING PROTOCOLS, NORAD and WAR GAMES

14. On 9/11/2001 there were three modes of scrambling interceptors in active use:

- a. in defense of country;
- b. in assistance of aircraft suffering in-flight emergencies;
- c. in dealing with hijacked aircraft.

The first two of the three scrambling protocols call for the immediate scrambling of interceptors without delay once the decision is made that requires a scramble.

15. In the first case, upon the notification of enemy aircraft [or sometimes missiles] inbound towards the continental United States, or in some instances the continent of North America, interceptors are immediately scrambled to conduct this interception action, and there is no need for approvals from the Pentagon to scramble aircraft. NORAD and its facilities, including scramble or “hot” bases react to the situation immediately **AND MAKE DECISIONS TO SCRAMBLE TOTALLY WITHIN FIELD FACILITY OPERATIONS**. Reports of these activities are filed in an “after action” format. The immediacy of the need to scramble military aviation assets in this scenario is of utmost importance because of the emergency.

16. In the second case, upon notification from the FAA that assistance of any U.S. Military aviation asset, such as interceptors, are required to deal with an “in-flight emergency”, NORAD’s field facilities are required to **IMMEDIATELY SCRAMBLE** pertinent military aviation assets to respond to the situation.

17. In the third instance, the possible hijacking of an aircraft, the request for

Military aviation assets comes from whatever facility or information source suspects that a hijacking may be unfolding. This may be law enforcement, the State Department, or sometimes an FAA air traffic control facility that hears something from an aircraft suggesting that a hijacking is taking place, or from seeing a special hijacking transponder code being transmitted by an aircraft. In these situations the need for an immediate scrambling of Military aviation assets is less time critical.

18. In the unfolding events of 9/11/2001 each of the four airliners involved, AA11, UA175, UA93 and AA77, showed all the signs of aircraft suffering “in-flight emergencies” WELL BEFORE any of them were considered to be suffering a possible “hijacking”. These signs are:

Loss of radio contact;

Diverting off of an assigned routing or altitude without ATC approval;

Loss of transponder;

19. Each of the four airliners showed each of these characteristics and therefore should have been considered as suffering “in-flight emergencies”. In fact, there were no signs establishing that the airliners were suffering a possible hijacking, most importantly, the transmission of the hijacking transponder codes to ATC [air traffic control]. The ONLY information that was presented to ATC that these airliners were being hijacked were a few radio transmissions that noted some troubling disturbances in the cockpits, and that sounded like radio transmissions from an Arabic sounding person. It is CRITICAL TO NOTE that these radio transmissions cannot be positively established as coming from any of the specific airliners themselves and could have come from ANY OTHER aircraft aloft at high altitudes in the northeastern part of the U.S..

20. The first indication that there was trouble in an airliner came from the Boston ARTCC air traffic controller noticing the loss of radio contact, then the loss of transponder, and then the radical and unapproved course change exhibited by AA11. This sequence of events started at 08:14am.

21. Normal protocols for the FAA to reach out to NORAD for assistance would place the first call to NEADS for help no later than 08:21am while AA11 was exhibiting the symptoms of suffering an “in-flight emergency”.

22. The first radio transmission suggesting that a hijacking was taking place happened at 08:24am. For a period of ten minutes, the ONLY possibility to explain the odd behavior of AA11 was that it was suffering an “in-flight emergency” such as a total loss of electrical power or circuitry.

23. This observance of an “in-flight emergency” should have called for an IMMEDIATE scramble of Military aviation assets to help out AA11, and this information should be available for discovery through a thorough analysis of ALL ATC audio tapes. The FBI has not released all FAA sector audio tapes as noted by Collin Scoggins, the Military Liason Officer working at ZBW on 9/11/2001.

24. The net affect of the Arab sounding radio transmissions was to make ATC suspect that a hijacking was taking place, which in turn, would engage a different and slower scramble protocol, where the Pentagon’s approval was needed before interceptors were scrambled.

25. At 08:38am the Boston ARTCC called NEADS [the Northeast Air Defense Sector] and asked for direct support of scrambled interceptors. This request SUPERCEDES ALL OTHER PROTOCOLS because the FAA is the responsible organization when dealing with aircraft in ANY kind of distress.

26. NEADS did NOT follow this request by Boston ARTCC. The interceptors were allowed off the ground only after there was a pertinent and “impromptu” decision made by a NORAD commander in Florida. This order in itself was outside the “hijacking scramble protocol”, demonstrating that the commander who issued the order saw and understood that the precedent activities of the U.S. Military had not followed the correct scramble protocol.

27. The approval for scrambling was issued at 08:46am, and the interceptors were airborne at 08:52. This six-minute delay was the result of the interceptors NOT being given higher departure priority as called for in scrambles for “in-flight emergencies” and instead being slotted for normal first-come-first-served departure sequences used in hijacking protocols unless specifically requested otherwise.

28. It has been established that there were several overlapping War Games Exercises that were scheduled and in operation on or about 9/11/2001. The U.S. Military actually moved up dates for one or more War Games that usually occur in or after

October every year to the 9/11/2001 timeframe. It is also understood that these War Games included many hijacking scenarios as almost all War Games Exercises do.

29. It is my experience that all participants in upcoming War Games Exercises, IE: the FAA facilities and all participating Military facilities and squadrons, are not only briefed ahead of time about the possibility of upcoming War Games Exercises, but indeed, these early warnings are used to create opportunities for both new and refresher training of such War Games Exercises within ALL the facilities and squadrons that will soon be included in executing the War Games Exercises. This is certainly true within the FAA's En Route ATC environment, and I have been told that it is the very same within the Military.

30. I conclude that the "hijacking" protocols and associated expectations were deliberately pre-placed in the minds of individuals participating in the events of 9/11/2001. Testimony and recorded conversations within the Military by those participating in these War Games Exercises have been made public. In them concerns are expressed that the hijacking portions of the War Games Exercises may have been early, and whether or not the unfolding events were "real world" or still part of the War Games Exercises.

31. In conclusion, I am convinced that the Air Defense System for the United States of America, as historically provided by NORAD and their northeast geographical sector known as NEADS, was deliberately compromised by elements within the U.S. Military by:

a. scheduling War Games Exercises which included "hijacking scenarios" so that, because of confusion, there would be a delay in appropriate reactions, including the usual and expected immediate scrambling protocols associated with "in-flight emergencies".

b. radio transmissions that sounded like the voices of Arabic sounding people which have not been established as having come from the radios onboard the affected airliners and could have come from another airborne platform flying in the northeast airspace.

c. the failure of NEADS, which served as the communications nexus and

SINGLE FACILITY responsible for all air defense activities in the northeast region of the U.S.A. on 9/11/2001, and was responsible for all the airspace in which all the flights, including the interceptors, finally scrambled, to take appropriate, timely and affirmative action to scramble interceptors when they were directly asked to do so by the FAA's Boston ARTCC.

32. NORAD, through its northeast sector facility NEADS, was directly told at 08:38 am that the FAA needed Military assistance due to possible hijackings.

33. Existing immediate scramble protocols to assist the FAA were not followed, and three OTHER airliners were suffering from either "in-flight emergencies," or hijackings, or both, and these three airliners were allowed to fly unabated in U.S. airspace until they each allegedly crashed at: 09:03, 09:32/38, and 10:03/06, respectively.

34. There was a delay in response of 25 minutes for UA175 before its crash, a delay of 54/48 minutes for AA77 before its alleged crash, and a delay of 85/88 minutes for UA93 before its alleged crash-shutdown.

35. A senior commander at NORAD, upon finding out about the delayed scramble situation, IMMEDIATELY gave instructions to allow the interceptors to be scrambled because he knew that the usual scramble protocols had not been adhered to.

36. Once interceptors were scrambled from Langley **well in time** to intercept the unknown high speed air vehicle displayed as a primary target [eventually thought to be AA77] approaching Washington, D.C. from the west over West Virginia, they were not broken off of their normal easterly departure routings, thus resulting in a further delay in response.

UNSEEN TARGETS, TRACKS and RADAR DATA ANALYSIS

37. After analyzing all the radar data available to me from the FAA via the 84th RADES Radar Squadron, a military facility tasked with monitoring and recording all radar data fed into it from its various military radar sites, FAA radar sites, and joint use radar sites, I have concluded that three of the four airliners, AA11, UA175 and UA93 were kept in full and positive radar contact from just after lift off at their departure

airports up until their respective crash points as follows:

AA11-Boston to WTC1

UA175-Boston to WTC2

UA93-Newark to Shanksville, PA

38. AA77 was lost to positive radar contact in eastern Ohio, and was NEVER re-radar identified. The high-speed eastbound primary radar target eventually seen by Danielle O'Brien at Dulles Tower-Potomac Approach and on a heading towards Washington, D.C., which then made a large turn into, or over, the Pentagon, has been PRESUMED to be AA77, but that presumption is based upon unreliable evidence found, or placed, at the Pentagon crash site, or misread in a reverse-engineered identification process.

THE PHANTOM AA 11

39. It is my conclusion that the "phantom AA11," eventually offered as an excuse for the misdeployment of the scrambled interceptors from Langley away from the actual primary target headed for Washington, D.C. was in fact the computer generated TRACK for AA11 that kept on heading in a southwesterly direction after AA11, the real airplane, struck WTC1.

40. Tracks are created from computer programs that place alphanumeric symbols in the vicinity of the target that the track is associated with enabling the system to maintain the identity of, and the tracked location of, that specific target. Tracks are designed to "search" for its associated target along the route of flight, or along the last generated heading and ground speed noted by the track for its specific host aircraft.

41. After the track for AA11 "lost" its host target [because AA11 entered WTC1], the track for AA11, showing all the same specific alphanumerics identifying it as AA11 [with the exception of a coast track symbol "#"] that were attached to the real AA11 before it hit WTC1, kept on traveling on the last heading and groundspeed known [towards Washington, D.C.] as it kept "searching" for its recently-lost host target.

42. Tracks will remain in COAST MODE and moving at the last known heading and speed, or routing and speed, until manually ended by human computer inputs. An inexperienced person seeing this alphanumeric display, but failing to see that the host

target was not there, could conclude that AA11 was still airborne even though only the track for AA11 was moving across the radar scopes.

43. An experienced person would see the COAST MODE of this track and could potentially convince an inexperienced person that AA11 was still airborne because all the alphanumeric zymology was the same except for the smallish “#” sign having replaced the target symbol.

WHY AA11 WAS NOT SEEN BY NEADS

44. The government has acknowledged the existence of a 24-second delay in the delivery of radar data from NORAD’s main computers to NEADS’s radar displays in upstate New York. It is my opinion that the attempts to point out AA11 to NEADS failed because the system was compromised within that 24-second delay.

45. Long Range Radar [LRR] sweeps, or refreshes, occur every twelve seconds. The 24-second delay represents two separate opportunities for target elimination by a radar technician planted in between the original radar source in NORAD and the NEADS radar sectors and radar scopes.

46. NORAD radar systems have the computer program capacity to create “inputs” that present fake aircraft targets to affected NORAD sectors during War Games Exercises so indiscernible from REAL targets so as to make it impossible for NORAD radar technicians to be able to tell the difference between computer generated targets and real targets. This capacity allows for the presentation of War Games that are as close to reality as possible.

47. NORAD radar and computer systems have the capacity to “output”, or “out-take”, specific targets from the radar data base as well. Therefore, after an “input” has served its purpose in a War Game Exercise, this target can be eliminated, returning the radar screens to “real world”.

48. This radar target “out-take” capability enabled the secret elimination of the real target of AA11 from the radar data base generated by NORAD prior to the radar data being sent along to NEADS.

49. It is my conclusion that this was the purpose behind the inexplicable, and so far, unexplained, 24-second delay acknowledged by the Department of Defense and NORAD as being in existence on 9/11/2001.

50. The net result of the removal of the REAL target of AA11 was that the radar techs at NEADS could not get a geographical position for AA11 and consequently, had a more difficult time assessing the critical nature of the unfolding events, and had to spend over 40 phone calls busy with such identification activities. In addition, NEADS would have had a far more difficult time in transmitting any target location information to interceptors' target and tracking systems.

AA77 LOST TO INDIANAPOLIS ATRCC IN EASTERN OHIO

51. Radar data collected from radar antennae across the country is processed by the RDP [radar data processing] computer programs in all the ARTCC computers. Pertinent radar data, both secondary radar returns and primary radar returns, which are handled separately, are eventually sent to individual air traffic control sectors. It is first allocated or sent to geographical areas or zones called "radar sort boxes" which are established as a large contiguous grid-matrix-mosaic covering the entire United States of America and somewhat beyond where needed. These "sort boxes" usually have several radar antennae sweeping through them. The best radar returns of the multiple radar antennae coverages are selected to be sent to each individual "radar sort box". There are computer commands that are entered which control which radar data from which radar site is to be allowed to be sent through to each individual "sort box". These commands include the capacity to inhibit all radar data sent into any specific "radar sort box or boxes".

52. The primary radar "black hole" in which AA77 was lost to positive radar contact in eastern Ohio could have been created by inputting commands into the RDP [radar data processing] computer programs that instructed that primary radar data NOT be sent into the group of "radar sort boxes" that represented the region in which AA77 was lost to positive radar identification and contact.

53. The computer commands controlling the sending of radar data to all the applicable “radar sort boxes” is usually located at the “systems engineers” station at each individual ARTCC. Through keyboard inputs from such stations, all of the “radar sort boxes” within the entire airspace that each ARTCC is responsible for, is assigned the appropriate radar data input.

54. Like any other computer input station, or computer program, it is hackable or controllable from other locations should the proper hacking or code-breaking be utilized.

55. On the morning of 9/11/2001, it is entirely possible that some agent other than qualified Indianapolis ARTCC personnel, or a secretive operative within the Indianapolis ARTCC, could have, without detection, eliminated the input flows of primary radar data into the specific “radar sort boxes” that covered eastern Ohio where AA77’s primary radar target was never observed.

ANALYZING RADAR DATA AROUND WASHINGTON, D.C. AND THE PENTAGON

56. I have analyzed the radar data made available via FOIA requests and provided by the Military’s RADES 84th Radar Data Squadron, and I have cross-referenced this data with eyewitness accounts developed by researchers such as Mark Gaffney as represented in his book, *The 9/11 Mystery Plane*.

57. I have concluded that the RADES radar data has been tampered with and truncated so as to NOT show certain radar targets after the alleged impact time at the Pentagon.

58. Multiple eyewitnesses have reported seeing a large aircraft flying low around the Washington, D.C.-Pentagon-Mall area at altitudes that would normally create an observable target for local and long range radar systems in that area.

59. One eyewitness establishes a large aircraft making a low altitude left bank over the Georgetown section of the Washington, D.C. area, just northwest of the Pentagon across the Potomac.

60. The RADES radar data shows a target approaching the Pentagon from the west, then making a sweeping 330 degree right hand turn, then heading back to the Pentagon on a northeasterly heading, then a loss of that target just west of the Pentagon.

61. Another radar hit is shown on that projected target right AT the side of the Pentagon, and then no target at all for a few terminal radar sweeps [approximately five seconds apart].

62. When radar stations are situated near tall buildings, the buildings constitute what is known as “ground clutter” on the radar screen. It appears as a primary target, but it never moves. The radar data that I analyzed contains ground clutter that could be the Washington Monument or the high rises in Rosslyn as the object approaches the Pentagon, but that clutter disappears just after the aircraft reaches the Pentagon.

63. I conclude : a. that the loss of the target to the immediate west of the Pentagon is most likely due to the low altitudes between the Navy Annex and the Pentagon;

b. that the reappeared target is most likely because this target climbed up and over the Pentagon thereby becoming visible to local radar systems;

c. that the loss of the ground clutter in the vicinity of Georgetown at the projected location and time that an over-flying air vehicle would be in that exact geographical location indicates that the radar data was scrubbed or eliminated at that point to hide the fact that it was an over-flight.

64. The radar data made public stops shortly after the alleged crash at the Pentagon permitting no further analysis.

65. Also scrubbed from the radar data is any evidence of the E-4B flight captured by CNN.

FLIGHT DATA RECORDER OF AA11

66. There are questions concerning the reliability of the information provided to the public allegedly derived from the FDR [Flight Data Recorder] found at the Pentagon

that is said to belong to AA77.

67. The last modification to the data inside the FDR happened approximately four hours before it was found at the Pentagon which was many hours after the alleged crash of AA77 at the Pentagon. This is evidence that the FDR was tampered with at some point between the alleged crash time at the Pentagon and the recovery time established by the government.

68. There are no matching serial numbers establishing a history that the FDR recovered at the Pentagon was indeed the FDR that was onboard AA77 on 9/11/2001.

69. There is radar data and air traffic controller testimony that AA77 had begun a descent at the west end of its westbound leg just before it was lost to positive radar contact in eastern Ohio.

70. The FDR data does NOT show the beginning of this descent, further evidence of tampering.

71. The last heading noted by FAA air traffic controllers and FAA radar data establishes that AA77 was headed southwest bound and NOT eastbound before AA77 was lost to positive radar contact.

72. AA77 was captained by Chic Burlingame, who, approximately a year before 9/11 and while on National Guard duty, participated in the analysis of the defensive capabilities of the Pentagon should it be attacked by a hijacked airliner that would be used as an airborne bomb.

73. According to Burlingame's family he would NEVER give up his aircraft to anyone attempting to take control of it, especially anyone wielding small box-cutter knives who was many inches shorter and tens of pounds lighter in physical stature.

OPERATION NORTHWOODS AS HISTORICAL PRECEDENT

74. Operation Northwoods was a secret plan developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the approval of President John F. Kennedy that called for the "swapping out" of an airliner with a substitute that would then be deliberately crashed or shot down. According to the plan, the destruction of the airliner was to be blamed on Cuba in order to precipitate military intervention against Castro

75. The “swapped-out” aircraft was to be flown by a trusted and cooperative agent of the U.S. Military who would pilot the original aircraft to an undisclosed or secure airport so that its passengers could be dealt with accordingly.

76. A further part of Operation Northwoods included bombing U.S. cities causing deaths of U.S. citizens and blaming the event on Cuba.

77. The primary target approaching the Pentagon did not have its civilian transponder turned on which would have shown the altitude of this aircraft, reported to be some 7000 feet as it began its 330 degree turn and dive toward the Pentagon.

78. A military air vehicle equipped with a military IFF [Identification-Friend or Foe] transponder would not be seen by any FAA radar system, yet this IFF transponder WOULD be seen by Military radar systems in use for the protection of the Washington, D.C. area.

79. Such a Military IFF transponder would contain altitude information of the air vehicle, and this would be seen by the Military radar facility.

80. There appears to be no other source for the 7000 ft altitude reported by the government.

81. Upon reading the Military IFF transponder, the ground-to-air defense system protecting the Washington, D.C. area on 9/11/2001, would automatically “stand-down” or disarm.

THE PRIMARY TARGET APPROACHING WASHINGTON, D.C.

82. An unidentified air vehicle “popped up” or appeared on the radar screens of the PLA (The Plains, VA) radar site approximately 150NM west of the PLA radar site. The floor of the PLA radar system in this region and west to a point 200NM west of the PLA radar site [the outermost range of the PLA radar system], was low enough to have the capability to pick up the primary target of AA77.

83. Had AA77 been the air vehicle flying the route between just east of where AA77 first was lost to positive radar contact over eastern Ohio, and where the unidentified high speed primary target “popped up”, it should have been tracked by the PLA site.

84. According to the FDR data allegedly in use onboard AA77, on this specific portion of the flight, AA77 was flying at an altitude well above this radar coverage floor, and therefore, SHOULD have been seen by the PLA radar site in this area at such altitudes.

85. AA11 was NOT seen by the PLA radar site until a target “popped up” at the 150NM point west of the PLA radar site.

86. This primary target that “popped up” at the 150NM point west of the PLA radar site over central West Virginia WAS NOT AA77 because if it were AA77 flying at the altitudes established by the FDR, the PLA radar site would have seen and presented this primary target.

87. There is a radar target report, or readout, covering the above mentioned route segment prepared by the Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center that shows such a high speed primary target traveling this exact leg on the eastbound route.

88. The FAA person responsible for creating this radar report or readout acknowledges, within the report:

- a. being unqualified to create such a report or readout, and
- b. that he was helped in this assignment by a Military person at the Indianapolis Center, and
- c. that, the report or readout from the Indianapolis ARTCC derived its radar data from a radar site located in Bedford, Virginia.

89. Upon comparing geographical locations in time between the FDR that was alleged to be that of AA77, and the geographical locations in time for the Bedford radar site, the geographical locations in time were within 400 feet of each other.

90. In the real world, such duplicate and exacting geographical locations in time from two radically different sources, the FDR and the Bedford radar site, is a virtual impossibility because of the width and inaccuracies of the radar beam and the timing mechanisms used to record radar beam returns.

91. I conclude that one of the above noted sources establishing geographical locations in time, was used to create the OTHER source’s geographical location in time, a further indication of evidence tampering and data manipulation.

CONCLUSION

92. It is my opinion that during the chaos of landing all of the airborne aircraft on the morning of 9/11/2001, AA77 could have easily diverted to any number of undisclosed airports or Military airbases without detection.

93. The Boeing 757, piloted by Chic Burlingame, is similar to Boeing aircraft used for transport purposes by the U.S. Military and could have been absorbed into the Military fleet of aircraft.

94. The gap of eight minutes of radar returns after AA77 was lost to positive radar contact, in which there were no primary radar target returns shown between 150NM and 200NM west of the PLA radar site, comprised enough time and opportunity for the “swapping in” of a replacement flight and “swapping out” of the original AA77 to be achieved at low altitudes in and around the valleys and between the ridges of the Appalachian Mountains in West Virginia.

The foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: June 25, 2009

Kingston, WA

Signed: _____/S/_____

Robin Dirk Hordon
